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Abstract 
 This paper examines the effects that changes in the Chinese government’s methods of labor 
control have had on rural migrant workers in the Guangdong province. The situation of rural migrant 
workers in China resembles that of foreign migrant workers in other countries, because institutional 
barriers such as the hukou (household registration) system prevent rural migrants from becoming 
permanent residents of cities and reduce them to second class citizens with limited benefits. By 
employing ethnographic data from anthropological field research among migrant workers in paint 
factories in the cities of Shenzhen and Zhuhai, this paper discusses how neoliberal labor control has 
created self-reliant migrant workers. Neoliberal labor control is represented by the gradual relaxation of 
rural-to-urban migration restrictions and propaganda movements that promote neoliberal discourses. 
Drawing from the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, the paper argues that neoliberal labor 
policies facilitate exploitation because they allow the government to reduce state welfare for rural 
migrant workers living in cities while at the same time mitigating the potential for unrest.  
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Introduction 
 My paper examines how changes in the Chinese government’s method of labor control 
from socialist to neoliberal have created self-reliant migrant workers. Neoliberal labor control 
refers to deregulated labor policies that increase the role of the private sector. In China, 
neoliberal labor control is represented by two important actions:  the gradual relaxation of 
rural-to-urban migration restrictions and propaganda movements that promote neoliberal 
discourses. As a result of these two actions, migrant workers believe that they have agency over 
their personal improvement and accept failure as the fault of the individual rather than society. 
Thus, neoliberal labor policies facilitate exploitation: they allow the government to reduce state 
welfare for migrant workers living in cities while at the same time mitigating the potential for 
unrest. My ethnographic fieldwork identifies migrant workers in chemical plants in Shenzhen 
and Zhuhai who have internalized neoliberal ideals.  
Popular visions of post-socialism foretell of a progressive transition towards democratic 
politics and free market capitalism, but I argue that the transition in China is more sophisticated. 
Actions that are regarded as signs of a retreating state may actually enhance the power of the 
state. Chinese government policies towards labor migration fall into the category of actions 
that need further interpretation. Over the past half century, the Chinese government’s 
economic policies have evolved from a socialist model of development to a capitalist model 
that takes advantage of its large labor force to grow labor-intensive, export-oriented industries 
(Fan 1995). Labor migration from the rural interior plays an important role in the economic 
development of coastal regions. 
3 
 
Labor migration is an interesting situation in China because the migrant workers are 
Chinese rather than foreign. While rural migrants are citizens, their situation resembles that of 
foreign migrant workers in other countries. Institutional barriers such as the hukou (household 
registration) system prevent rural migrants from becoming permanent residents of cities.  The 
term liudong renkou (“floating population”) describes a group of between 114 million and 152 
million Chinese migrant workers who take temporary residential status in the destination cities 
while leaving family members and children in rural areas (Zhu 2007).  
Post-socialism and uneven development   
The designations of “socialist” and “post-socialist” are based on command versus 
market economy structures, along with attached historical, sociocultural, and political 
characteristics. The past half century has witnessed the gradual transformation of state 
socialism, including the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Many post-socialist countries 
experienced economic recessions and depressions during the initial years of reform, caused by 
the cost of implementing a new economic system and changing the structure of output 
(Matkowski 2004:48).  
Post-socialist societies are characterized by economic and political change, exhibiting 
trends such as an increasing private wealth, a growing consumer culture, the emergence of 
privately owned enterprises, and marketization and privatization. China exhibits many of these 
trends despite its legacy of strong socialist practices (Zhang 2001:179). A common 
interpretation of post-socialist change is that of a progressive narrative where good triumphs 
over evil, market capitalism replaces socialism, and democratic processes overturn 
totalitarianism. Several scholars, however, reject this metanarrative on the basis of inherent 
4 
 
complexities in the reconfiguration of societies (Verdery 1996, Humphrey 1991). For example, 
some former socialist countries experience a return to feudalist modes of organization in the 
form of patron-client relationships and Mafia-style coalitions. This process is defined as the 
privatization of power (Verdery 1996). Also, post-socialist societies are not necessarily 
characterized by the retreat of the state. Zhang (2001) calls into question the weakening of the 
Chinese state in post-socialist contexts, arguing that social domination still exists but in a 
different form of patron and client networks. 
This paper argues that post-socialism in China does not imply a retreat of the state. In 
regards to labor migration, the Chinese government has relaxed its hukou system to allow 
greater spatial mobility of its population (Zhang 2001:179). However, closer examination 
reveals that direct control has been replaced by neoliberal control. Neoliberalism does not 
foretell the end of government, but rather represents a prolonged government with different 
techniques. Strict labor policies have been altered and relaxed to promote an export-oriented 
economy, taking advantage of the labor surplus and movement from the rural interior. 
Furthermore, by promoting the suzhi (quality) movement, a form of propaganda in which 
government dictates morality and expresses the need to raise the quality of the population 
through education and population control, the government makes workers believe that they 
are low suzhi and need to advance economically. After internalizing these neoliberal discourses, 
workers act according to the state’s objectives. My ethnography will show that workers accept 
neoliberal labor policies with reduced welfare because they believe that the new policies serve 
their own interests.  
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The Chinese government’s philosophy of economic development has evolved over the 
past half century. In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) realized that coastal areas were 
more developed than the interior. This ushered in the first Five Year Plan (1953-1957), in which 
more than two thirds of industrial projects and one half of industrial investment was directed 
towards the interior (Kirkby 1985:138). Poor interior provinces were allowed to keep their 
revenues in state (Lardy 1975). During this era, the Chinese government’s internal migration 
policy reflected the philosophy of a socialist planned economy, which viewed big cities as the 
cause for problems like unemployment and poor infrastructure. Thus, rural to urban migration 
was strictly controlled for the sake of social stability (He and Pooler 2002). The Chinese 
government instituted the hukou system of household registration, which resembles the Soviet 
Union’s propiska (internal passport) system in how it restricts population mobility between 
rural and urban areas (Chan and Buckingham 2010:587).  
In the 1960s, national defense became the top priority of the central government with 
pressure from the Vietnam War and tense Soviet and US relations. Defense policy merged with 
economic policy in the form of the “third-front” or san xian, which articulated a strategy of 
avoiding investments in vulnerable coastal cities (First Front), adjacent areas (Second Front), 
and instead constructing large capital projects and industries in the interior (Third Front). The 
first two decades witnessed China’s socialist regime choosing national integration and stability 
over national economic growth. It is estimated that China’s industrial output is 10-15% below 
what it would have been had the “third-front” strategy never been undertaken (Naughton 
1988). In addition, migration policy emphasized urban-to-rural youth transfer, shangshan 
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xiaxiang, in which urban university graduates were placed in remote border areas during the 
Cultural Revolution (He and Pooler 2002).   
The post-Mao period after 1976 reversed the policies of the previous administration, 
with Deng Xiaoping, who focused on efficiency rather than egalitarianism. According to the 
philosophy of this new period, some regions should get rich first in order to set the example 
and create wealth for other regions. Furthermore, China began taking advantage of its large 
labor force by specializing in labor-intensive, export oriented industries (Fan 1995). The 
mentality shift indicated an evolution away from socialist thinking.  
 In the 1980s, the Chinese government implemented the “three economic belts” model, 
in which the eastern region specialized in export-oriented and foreign trade sectors, the central 
region focused on agriculture and energy, and the western region specialized in animal 
husbandry and mineral exploitation. Growth in the eastern region intensified as China’s export 
economy developed, thanks to Deng Xiaoping’s “open door policy.” Five cities were designated 
Special Economic Zones (SEZs): Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Shantou, Xiamen, and Hainan. The SEZs 
attracted foreign direct investment into the country with tax exemptions for foreign companies 
(Fan 1995). Labor migration featured strongly in the rapid rise of China’s coastal cities. The 
barriers to migration were lifted with reforms to the hukou system in the 1980s, releasing 
surplus labor from the rural interior of China (Meng and Zhang 2001).  
 Post-socialist China’s emphasis on capitalist economic growth driven by export-oriented 
sectors at the expense of uniform national growth is responsible for uneven development of 
the coastal cities in contrast with a lagging interior. This uneven development explains the 
massive rural to urban migration flows, with the greater growth of jobs in the coastal cities. 
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Despite the acceleration of market forces, post-socialist China continues to exhibit some of the 
qualities of its predecessor socialist state. The hukou system remains in effect. Although weaker 
than before, it disadvantages rural segments of the population to the benefit of urban 
segments. The hukou system still exists in order to create a class of temporary workers from the 
countryside to supply industries that permanent residents in the cities would avoid. This also 
allows local authorities avoid bearing the cost of urbanization and development. The cost of 
labor production is borne by the rural society, because rural society must support the 
healthcare costs and pensions of migrant workers who only reside there part-time (Pun 2004).  
Hukou system and theories of temporary migration 
 Past socialist regimes have adopted migration control as a tool to manage the labor 
market and support the centrally planned economy. In 1932, the former Soviet state 
implemented an internal passport system called propiska, which denied rural migrants the right 
to freely move to the city. The Soviet government saw unorganized migration and urbanization 
as a problem, claiming that controlled migration systems provided “social growth without social 
problems” (Buckley 1995:898). Passports contained residence permits for all persons over the 
age of sixteen, making it illegal to reside at an address other than the one listed by the permit. 
The Soviet state justified the propiska system as an expansion of government protection, but it 
forced those who changed residence to notify authorities within 24 hours and criminally 
charged those who were discovered to reside illegally (Buckley 1995:902). The propsika system 
was officially abolished following the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1993, Russia passed a law 
titled “On the Right of Citizens to Freedom of Movement and Choice of Place of Sojourn and 
Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation,” which represented Russia’s official 
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stance on removing the propsika system: the current law requires mandatory notification of 
residence to authorities. The current system differs from the prospika system because 
government authorities do not have the authority to withhold registration from individuals who 
properly apply for it (Rubins 1998:550). 
The Chinese government implemented the hukou system in the late 1950s, modeling it 
after the Soviet prospika system. The hukou system is a dual system that identifies every citizen 
along two axes: registration classification and registration location (Fan 2002). The two 
classifications are “non-agricultural” or “agricultural”. The location refers to where a person 
resides. Before the 1980s, it was impossible for a migrant worker to move to a city and survive, 
because of the rationing system and permit limitations. For example, the hukou system 
specified that rural residents who were not state employees were categorized as agricultural 
households and thus not eligible for grain rations. The hukou system tied location with food 
rationing and coupons; without coupons, it was impossible for a migrant to move to an urban 
area and survive (Meng and Zhang 2001). In 1958, the “Ordinances of Household Registration 
for Chinese Residence” required permission from the urban destination or local authority for 
migrants moving to urban areas (He and Pooler 2002).  
Economic reforms went hand in hand with hukou system reform. In the mid-1980s, the 
food rationing system was replaced with a market system, which enabled individuals to buy 
food at market price and survive in the city (Meng and Zhang 2001). In 1980, the central 
government designated Shenzhen as the country’s first Special Economic Zone (Wang, Wang 
and Wu 2009). In 1985, the Shenzhen local authority allowed rural migrants to register as 
temporary residents (Shen 1995). A migrant could register temporary residence with the Public 
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Security Bureau or local police station after he or she was hired by an enterprise. Enterprises 
paid an “Increased City Capacity Fee” to the city (Pun 2004). In the following years, Shenzhen 
grew into a larger metropolitan area and took over local agricultural villages; in the process, 
local farmers’ hukou status was revised from agricultural to non-agricultural (Wang, Wang and 
Wu 2009). 
 Even despite the reforms, rural migrants face many disadvantages. Temporary residency 
permits in Shenzhen only last one year and are renewed annually for a fee, but if there is no 
work, the migrants must leave. This enables local authorities to avoid bearing the burdens of 
urbanization. The temporary residence system allows local authorities to avoid providing 
housing, job security, and welfare to rural migrants (Pun 2004). Rural migrants do not receive 
the same benefits as permanent urban residents, which turns them into second class citizens. 
Due to the hukou system, rural migrants in China face similar conditions as undocumented 
immigrants in the United States and foreign workers in Germany and Japan (Fan 2002). They 
are Chinese, but they do not enjoy the same benefits as urban-dwelling Chinese; this extra 
dimension contributes to an extra feeling of deprivation.  
 Existing theoretical approaches regarding temporary migration help explain both the 
rationale behind the hukou system and why it continues to be used despite economic reforms. 
Industrial economies segment labor demand in capital-intensive primary sector and labor-
intensive secondary sector (Piore 1979:86). Employers respond to low demand in the economy 
by laying off workers from the secondary sector. Locals do not work in the secondary sector due 
to the lower pay and job instability, which creates the need for external laborers. External 
laborers do not settle in the city, or else that would change their reference frame from the 
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place of origin to the place of destination. The hukou system ensures that migrant workers 
remain external laborers in the city without settling in the city. Their temporary status allows 
them to hold jobs in the secondary sector. 
 Furthermore, temporary migration features strongly in transition societies, but the type 
of migration may change as a society develops (Zelinsky 1971). In an early transitional society, 
there is massive movement from rural to urban areas. This changes when a society enters the 
late transitional society stage, in which urban-to-urban migration surpasses rural-to-urban 
migration. China has been in the early transitional stage since the mid-1980s. Its rapidly 
modernizing urban areas have been attracting massive movement from rural areas.  
 Finally, temporary migration is analyzed as a strategy that enables migrants to maximize 
income and minimize risk (Stark 1991). By spreading out between rural and urban locales, 
migrant workers can avoid the risk of not being able to make a living in the city. By keeping 
homes and farms in rural areas, migrant workers have a safety net in case they fail in the city. 
This theory provides one explanation for why migrants are willing to accept low wages and 
temporary status in the cities.  
Exploitation and the idea of neoliberal governmentality  
China has been assaulted by criticism from human rights activists. In the midst of Arab 
Spring in 2011, a few journalists predicted that the same phenomenon would be observed in 
China. China’s political dissidents such as Ai Wei Wei have gained attention in prominent 
international media outlets. According to popular views of China, resistance is inevitable 
because the regime is very oppressive and causes widespread discontent. Contrary to this 
romanticized idea of resistance, people in China do not resist despite discontent. My thesis 
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argues that resistance in China, or the lack thereof, can be explained by neoliberalism and 
neoliberal governmentality.  
Neoliberalism is commonly viewed as a market ideology that directly opposes 
governance and state activity (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). However, some scholars argue that 
neoliberalism is actually a tool of government. Zhang (2008) views neoliberalism as a technique 
of Foucault’s “biopolitics,” which means the use and impact of politics on all aspects of human 
life.  In Foucault’s view, the state has no essence, and is rather a function of its practices. 
Neoliberalism does not contradict the power or existence of the state, but is a new form of 
state planning that seeks to optimize resources and population control (Greenhalgh and 
Winckler 2005).  
More specifically, Foucault characterized government as three things: firstly, “the 
consequence of a particular form of power”; secondly, “the result of transformations inside the 
contemporary state”; and thirdly, the procedures that “enable the operation of power directed 
toward the regulation of a population using various apparatuses of security” (Powell and Cook 
2000:81). Governmentality expresses the idea that government is not only limited to negative 
and repressive actions, but also capable of producing positive and productive actions. The 
concept of governmentality offers a useful framework to understand the transition to liberalism 
and neoliberalism. It proposes three forms of power: governance by government in the 
traditional sense, through regulatory and bureaucratic bodies; governance through 
intermediate institutions such as schools, prisons, and hospitals; and self-governance by 
individuals (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). It is the third form of power that is applicable to 
the discussion of how neoliberalism can be viewed as a tool of government. Neoliberal forms of 
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government move away from the first two forms of power and toward forms of self-regulation, 
which take advantage of indirect techniques for controlling individuals. The neoliberal 
government’s production of knowledge and discourse is internalized by the population, which 
then guides the population’s behavior.  
Post-Socialist China’s labor policies of relaxing hukou restrictions and propagating the 
suzhi movement are a form of neoliberal governmentality. The concept of suzhi is related to a 
grandiose idea of “quality” – the need to raise the quality of the population through education 
and through population control (Woronov 2009). The Chinese party-state believes that 
increasing the population’s collective “quality” will make the country more competitive in the 
global field. Suzhi can be analyzed as an instrument of neoliberal governmentality because it is 
a discourse that is instilled in the population in order to exercise power over the population. 
Individuals who believe in the discourse act according to the aims of the state, and therefore, 
they are helping to secure the good of the entire population.  
The Chinese government’s emphasis on economic development based on cheap labor 
feeds into the concept of suzhi. As is expected in an industrial society, sophisticated urbanites 
are viewed as being higher quality than low-class rural farmers. The concept of suzhi is critical 
to the production of surplus value from rural migrant workers. Suzhi acts like an intangible 
operator in the labor contract, and it invisibly facilitates exploitation. The massive movement of 
millions of rural migrants to urban centers was viewed by local rural authorities as 
opportunities for quick poverty relief in the form of money remittances sent home (Yan 
2003).The interpretation, according to the concept of suzhi, was that “labor migration enables a 
transformation of peasants from the despised ‘hick bumpkin’ to human writ large in those who 
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have truly realized their full potential as human beings” (Yan 2003: 501). The reference to full 
value hints at the idea that migrant workers can be exploited as an apparatus of neoliberal 
capital accumulation. 
Neoliberal governmentality is a conscious attempt by the government to reduce welfare 
while mitigating popular discontent. Migrants view migration as a means to accumulate 
personal wealth and experiences. They view failure as not due to structural failures or injustice 
such as poor education, lack of healthcare, and poverty but their own fault of lacking suzhi. 
Migrants who believe in the national discourse may even feel that the obstacles, such as lack of 
permanent housing, are justified in the context of the personal quest. My paper will discuss the 
everyday measures that government introduced and workers accept, which increase self-
governance to reduce the burden on the state to regulate migration via non-ideological 
measures. At the same time, these measures strengthen the power of the state in guiding the 
behavior of the population.   
Fieldwork in Shenzhen and Zhuhai 
My goal was to study the lives of migrant workers in order to contextualize labor 
migration, demographic change, and development in China. Part of this goal was shaped by my 
personal and family background. My father grew up in a small farming town in the Hunan 
province of western China. Committed to upward mobility, he arrived in Beijing for higher 
education. He was 16 and it was his first time living in a large city. Just like the other rural 
migrants who have moved out to urban areas to seek economic opportunity, he came to Beijing 
to chase the economic dream that the quiet countryside could not afford him. He met my 
mother, and the two of them later immigrated to America in pursuit of a dream. The story of 
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this migration has been told to me many times. Over the summer of 2012, I decided to migrate 
in the opposite direction. I traveled to Shenzhen and Zhuhai, where for three weeks I lived and 
worked in paint factories with other migrant workers.  
My fieldwork focused on migrant workers because they clearly illustrate the post-
socialist transition to neoliberalism. Migrant workers are members of the rural population and 
thus the target of national discourse on suzhi and population quality.  They are most profoundly 
affected by the state’s production of ideas of feudal, backward, and low-quality peasants living 
on the edges of civilized human communities (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005:250). They have 
responded by migrating to urban environments, where they participate in China’s rapid and 
uneven development. Their stories are best positioned to reflect transition to neoliberalism, 
capturing both the rural and urban perspectives.  
I chose Shenzhen as the destination for this research project because Shenzhen is a city 
of immigrants, making it ideal for fieldwork on labor migration. Shenzhen used to be a small 
fishing village located next to Hong Kong. The Chinese government created the first Special 
Economic Zone (SEZ) in this area on August 1980, acquiring land from locals to build public 
infrastructure and attracting foreign direct investment from Hong Kong and foreign 
manufacturers. Migration featured heavily in the urbanization of Shenzhen, transforming it 
from a small village to a metropolitan with over ten million inhabitants.  
Shenzhen and Zhuhai are both located in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong 
province, which is a densely populated river delta in southern China and a locus of economic 
development. The PRD is also inclusive of Hong Kong and Macau. The PRD has attracted a large 
proportion of foreign direct investment in China. For example, in 1997 foreign direct 
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investment in Guangdong province was US$12.6 billion, which accounted for 24 percent of all 
of foreign investment in China (Shen and all 2000:  (Shen et al 2000:312).   
After choosing Shenzhen and the Guangdong province as the site for my fieldwork, I had 
personal contacts help me find a suitable factory. Through my mother’s cousin, I had a personal 
contact in the management of a chemicals company headquartered in Shenzhen. The chemicals 
company has manufacturing and processing plant operations in a handful of cities including 
Zhuhai, but reserves Shenzhen for its corporate and R&D campus. I spent three days in the 
Shenzhen corporate office, where I conducted personal interviews with workers throughout the 
organization ranging from property maintenance workers to management officers. I was then 
sent to join the Zhuhai processing plant for two and a half weeks, as I had requested in my 
initial proposal. I presented myself as a student in all interactions with others.  
Background 
Exploitation and the scrutiny of the international community 
 Labor exploitation in China has received increasing scrutiny in the international media in 
recent years. One of the recent stories features Apple, producer of the much-favored dynasty 
of computer and software products, and its supplier, Foxconn Technology Co, where the 
majority of its 1.2 million employees are involved in the production of Apple products. 
Attention has focused on reports of suicide at Foxconn’s plant in Longhua, Shenzhen, resulting 
from what some groups argue is unfair treatment of workers. Labor rights groups have also 
pointed fingers at Apple in the US, pressuring the company and its CEO, Tim Cook, to carry out 
extensive audits to mitigate the criticism (Blanchard).  
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 The issue of labor exploitation is common throughout history in various contexts. Labor 
exploitation in China, however, has drawn especial attention of the international community for 
several reasons. One of the reasons is China’s economic might as a manufacturing and export-
oriented country. China recently surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest economy by 
GDP in 2010, growing at a rate that will allow it to overtake the US economy by 2030. Its export 
sector dominates the world at $1.5 trillion, earning it the title of the “world’s factory.” Another 
reason is China’s state bureaucracy and lack of democracy. In either case, the international 
community can find much to criticize about China or China’s government, for outcompeting 
other economies and for ruling over its populace with an iron fist. Labor exploitation and cheap 
labor enables China’s economy to compete effectively on the world stage, and the state 
bureaucracy enables exploitation to occur and squashes any resistance.  
 Popular views of China hold that resistance in the country is inevitable because the 
regime is oppressive and the people are not content. Contrary to this romanticized idea of 
resistance, my thesis argues that lack of resistance in migrant workers can be explained by 
neoliberalism and neoliberal govenrmentality. These two concepts have created self-reliant 
migrant workers.   
Neoliberalism 
 Neoliberalism is commonly viewed as a market ideology that directly opposes 
governance and state activity, but its definition and context vary in the literature. Zhang weighs 
various definitions in his paper on neoliberalism and porters in Chongqing, China (2008). Aihwa 
Ong portrays neoliberalism as “market-based policies” which promote big capital at the 
expense of social programs (Ong 2006:1). Neoliberal states have been defined as those that 
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monopolize capital and power at the international level, at the expense of weaker states (Ong 
2006:12). Neoliberalism can be viewed in popular discourse and media as financial flows that 
harm local economies and currencies.  
 Scholars have argued over applying neoliberalism to study postsocialist and non-
Western contexts. The center of the debate is whether neoliberalism is appropriate given that 
governments of many postsocialist countries may exhibit authoritarian and illiberal policies. 
Zhang (2008) and other authors agree that in studying neoliberalism in postsocialist contexts, 
one should focus on the exceptions in which neoliberalism is introduced in population 
management or administration. Even though neoliberalism may not characterize the majority 
of the governing tactics of a postsocialist state, the instances in which it is used are examined 
for the purpose of this study. Furthermore, Zhang highlights the “wedding of neoliberal 
techniques and active state regulations” (2008: 68), in which the combination of neoliberal 
techniques and direct state regulation result in policy decisions and outcomes. In the case of 
labor migration in China, the combination of neoliberal techniques and active state regulation 
has created a situation in which regulation of rural to urban migration flow has gradually been 
relaxed in the past decades since the late 1950s.  
Neoliberal governmentality transforms rural migrants into self-reliant subjects 
The discussion of neoliberalism and its applications to postsocialist and non-Western 
contexts is closely related to the topic of neoliberal governmentality. Some scholars argue that 
neoliberalism is actually a tool of government. Zhang (2008) views neoliberalism as a technique 
of Foucault’s “biopolitics.” Biopolitics is defined as the use and impact of politics on all aspects 
of human life. Biopolitics includes the management of populations, which encompasses labor 
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migration. In Foucault’s view, the state has no essence, and is rather a function of its practices. 
Neoliberalism does not contradict the power or existence of the state but is a new form of state 
planning that seeks to optimize resources and population control.  
Foucault characterized government as three things: firstly, “the consequence of a 
particular form of power”; secondly, “the result of transformations inside the contemporary 
state”; and thirdly, the procedures that “enable the operation of power directed toward the 
regulation of a population using various apparatuses of security” (Powell and Cook 2000:81). 
Governmentality expresses the idea that government is not only limited to negative and 
repressive actions, but also includes positive and productive actions. The concept of 
governmentality offers a useful framework to understand the transition to liberalism and 
neoliberalism. It proposes three forms of power: governance by government in the traditional 
sense, through regulatory and bureaucratic bodies; governance through intermediate 
institutions such as schools, prisons, and hospitals; and self-governance by individuals 
(Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005). The third form of power is applicable to the discussion of how 
neoliberalism can be viewed as a tool of government. Neoliberal forms of government move 
away from the first two forms of power and toward forms of self-regulation, which take 
advantage of indirect techniques for controlling individuals. The neoliberal government’s 
production of knowledge and discourse is internalized by the population, which then guides the 
population’s behavior.  
 Neoliberal governmentality in China has created self-reliant migrant workers. Migrant 
workers believe they have agency over their personal improvement and accept any failure as 
their own rather than structural failures of the system. The creation of self-reliant migrant 
19 
 
workers is related to two important ideas: the gradual relaxation of hukou restrictions and the 
suzhi or “self-improvement” movement. The government is responsible for both of these 
factors, echoing Zhang’s (2008) “wedding” of neoliberal techniques and active state regulation.  
 The hukou system is a migration control tool that identifies citizens according to urban 
or rural classification. This system has undergone many changes since it was adopted in the late 
1950s. Before the 1980s, hukou was tied to grain and food rationing (Meng and Zhang 2001). In 
this manner, urban or rural citizens were limited to residing according to their classification lest 
they be cut off from food rationing. In 1985, the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone allowed rural 
migrants to register as temporary residents with local police stations after being hired and 
sponsored by an enterprise (Shen 1995, Pun 2004). This landmark policy change was the first 
step in a series of changes that relaxed hukou restrictions, ultimately allowing the increase in 
rural to urban migration.  
 The suzhi movement is a form of propaganda in which government dictates morality. 
Suzhi expresses the concept of “quality” and the need to raise the quality of the population 
through education and population control. An example of one slogan reads, “Raise the quality 
of the population, control the size of the population” (Woronov  2009:567). Propaganda exists 
in the forms of banners, signs, tacit communication through media communication and 
education, and a variety of other outlets. Research is not clear as to the statistics of propaganda 
reach. The suzhi movement is not a distinct, tangible government program, but rather 
references a broad set of government actions that have communicated to the population 
certain morals. It is derived from historical techniques to mold attitudes.  
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 The concept of suzhi facilitates exploitation because it imposes value concepts on 
humanity, abstracting and reducing human labor to a value articulation. It acts like an operator 
in the labor contract because according to suzhi values, labor migration transforms peasants 
from country bumpkins to humans who have realized their full potential (Yan 2003). Because 
the concept has been internalized by migrant workers, migrant workers view migration as a 
means of self-improvement, justifying any exploitative conditions that they encounter as 
challenges that must be overcome in the name of personal development. Suzhi may make 
workers believe that they are of low quality and thus deserve lower payments, adverse working 
conditions, and worse living conditions. Following suzhi, the larger population also agrees that 
the exploitation is justified for improving the quality of the population and developing the 
country’s economy. 
 Neoliberal governmentality has produced self-reliant migrant workers in China. 
Conscious actions by the Chinese state, including neoliberal developments in the control of 
labor in the form of hukou relaxation and direct attempts to dictate morality in the suzhi 
movement, have helped register the idea that migrant workers can be “exploited as a frontier 
of neoliberal capital accumulation” (Yan 2003:501).  
Labor markets in planned economies 
 Migration control is a form of managing the labor market in centrally planned 
economies. Migration control was a feature of the former Soviet state economy, which 
developed the internal passport system called propiska in 1932. This system restricted the right 
of rural citizens from freely moving to cities. The motivation behind the policy was to give the 
state more control over urbanization and migration. Buckley (1995) surveys the basic features 
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of the system. Only in special exceptions were citizens provided with temporary propiska, such 
as students leaving to study in other cities receiving propiska corresponding to their dorms. In 
most cases, local police authorities had the power to enforce propiska and could deny citizens 
from residing in a place without the appropriate propiska, thus returning the individual back to 
his or her place of permanent domicile. 
 The collapse of the Soviet Union brought about the dissolution of the propsika system. 
The 1993 legislation titled “On the Right of Citizens to Freedom of Movement and Choice of 
Place of Sojourn and Residence within the Borders of the Russian Federation” now represents 
Russia’s official law on migration. Citizens who move to new locations are required to notify 
their new residence to authorities. However, government no longer has the authority to 
withhold registration from individuals who apply to register in a new place (Rubins 1998:550).  
Migration control is also a feature of the Chinese economy. In the late 1950s, following a 
decree issued by Mao Zedong on January 9th, 1958, the Chinese government implemented the 
hukou system, or household registration system. It uses two axes: registration classification and 
registration location (Fan 2002). According to the first axis, registration classification can be 
“non-agricultural” or “agricultural”. According to the second axis, registration location refers to 
the place where a person resides.  
The hukou system has undergone hundreds of revisions. Before the 1980s, the hukou 
operated hand-in-hand with the rationing system. The hukou system specified that rural 
residents who were not state employees were categorized as agricultural households and thus 
not eligible for grain rations. This stipulated that rural residents should produce their own grain. 
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The hukou system tied location with food rationing and coupons; without coupons, it was 
impossible for a migrant to move to an urban area and survive (Meng and Zhang 2001).  
Economic reforms went hand in hand with hukou system reform. In the mid-1980s, the 
food rationing system was replaced with a market system, which enabled individuals to buy 
food at market price and survive in the city (Meng and Zhang 2001). In 1980, the central 
government designated Shenzhen as the country’s first Special Economic Zone (Wang, Wang 
and Wu 2009). In 1985, the Shenzhen local authority allowed rural migrants to register as 
temporary residents (Shen 1995). A migrant could register temporary residence with the Public 
Security Bureau or local police station after he or she was hired by an enterprise. Enterprises 
paid an “Increased City Capacity Fee” to the city (Pun 2004). In the following years, Shenzhen 
grew into a larger metropolitan area and took over local agricultural villages; in the process, 
local farmers’ hukou status was revised from agricultural to non-agricultural (Wang, Wang and 
Wu 2009). 
 Even despite the reforms, rural migrants face many disadvantages. Up until 2007, 
residency permits in Shenzhen only lasted one year and had to be renewed annually for a fee. 
Without employment, migrants were fined or forced to leave the city. This migration control 
allows local authorities to avoid bearing the burdens of urbanization. The temporary residence 
system allows local authorities to avoid providing housing, job security, and welfare to rural 
migrants (Pun 2004). Because rural migrants do not receive the same benefits as permanent 
urban residents, they are effectively turned into second class citizens. Due to the hukou system, 
rural migrants in China face similar conditions as undocumented immigrants in the United 
States and foreign workers in Germany and Japan (Fan 2002). In other words, the migration 
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from rural to urban environs is similar to the context of international migration. They are 
Chinese, but they do not enjoy the same benefits as urban-dwelling Chinese; this extra 
dimension contributes to an extra feeling of deprivation.  
Modern-day China hukou regulation and residence permits 
 With the end of food rationing in 1992, the “non-agricultural” and “agricultural” hukou 
classification lost its substantive importance. In response, a few cities removed the distinction, 
replacing it with location identification. In other words, places like Shenzhen and Guangzhou 
only recognize outsiders who lack the local hukou and insiders who possess it (Chan 2009). 
Those who lack local hukou are legally allowed to reside in the city if they possess residence 
permits (juzhuzheng). In the 2000s, many cities created secret police forces or “domestic 
security protection forces” to enforce residence permits (Wang 2010:84). If found residing in a 
city without a residence permit, an individual could be fined or forced to leave the city.  
 According to decree 169 issued by Shenzhen’s municipal government on July 31, 2007, 
any non-permanent resident who has stayed in Shenzhen for more than 30 days must apply for 
a residence permit. There are two types of residence permits: the Shenzhen residence permit 
and the temporary residence permit.  
Successful applicants for Shenzhen residence permits must meet one of the following 
qualifications:  
“ (1) They are working in Shenzhen, whether doing jobs (including housekeeping 
services jobs) or investing and establishing enterprises or other economic organizations; 
 (2) They own the house they inhabit in Shenzhen; 
 (3) They meet the relevant conditions for handling talent residence permits and 
overseas talent residence permits of Shenzhen; 
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 (4) They are starting up a business in Shenzhen and have the corresponding 
technological or financial conditions or they are creating cultural and artistic works in 
Shenzhen; 
 (5) They are receiving non-degree education in full-time schools including junior 
colleges and higher education institutions approved in Shenzhen; 
 (6) Other circumstances specified by the Municipal Government” (Decree No. 169) 
Most migrant workers fall under the first qualification. According to Decree No. 169, in 
order to prove employment, applicants must include with their application an employment 
certificate provided by a legally registered business. If the applicant is a married woman 
between the ages of 20 and 49, she must furnish a family planning certificate issued by the 
family planning office where she lives; failing this, the woman must undergo a pregnancy 
examination conducted by the government free of charge. The decree also spells out a 15-day 
window in which the applications must be approved or denied. In the event that an application 
is denied, the applicant will receive a temporary residence permit.  
In Shenzhen, the residence permit takes the shape of a credit card-sized ID card with a 
digital chip storing extensive information about the permit holder, including employment status, 
borrowing history, birth-planning record, and criminal record (Wang 2010). This information 
also feeds into an electronic database. According to Wang (2010), more than 30 thousand 
police stations across the country have electronic databases of hukou records. Many cities and 
counties share the information of 1.07 billion people, which consists of 83 percent of the 
population.  
Since the new Shenzhen decree went into effect in 2007, residence permits are valid for 
ten years. This extended the permit period from two years (after which a permit holder had to 
re-apply). As it stands, Shenzhen provides the following benefits to all residence permit holders: 
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employment referral services and training sessions organized by the government; free 
contraceptives and vaccinations for all children; right to public housing and public education; 
right to register a vehicle and apply for a driver’s license; right to exit and re-enter Shenzhen, 
including visiting Hong Kong and Macau; and right to participate in community management 
according to government regulation (Shenzhen’s residence card 2008). Although permit holders 
have the right to public education, in reality, migrant workers often pay additional fees to send 
their children to public schools. These fees consist of textbook fees and other miscellaneous 
fees, which permanent residents are exempt from. These fees can be high enough to create a 
barrier for low wage earning migrant workers. And so despite the right to public education, 
equal access to public education is less assured. Furthermore, health insurance is not a right 
accorded to permit holders.  
Hukou conversion 
In contrast to the magnitude of rural to urban migration, rural to urban hukou 
conversion is a very exceptional case. Rural to urban hukou transfer can be generally 
categorized as either individual or collective conversion. In the individual case, personal 
characteristics lead to one individual gaining hukou status in the destination city. In the 
collective case, farming villages are incorporated into an adjacent city or town, and the village is 
upgraded to an urban area with rural hukou holders given the right to convert as a 
consequence of policy. Zhang and Treiman (2013) have found that one of the primary 
determinants for rural to urban hukou transfer is matriculation at a tertiary educational 
institute. Furthermore, the probability of individual hukou conversion varies depending on age, 
with a greater likelihood of transferring status in between the ages of 18 and 22 than other 
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ages. The probability of hukou conversion was found to be below 6 in 1000, based on an 
empirical analysis of national survey results. 
With regards to hukou transfer, Shenzhen’s policies (Certain regulations 2005) indicate 
the individual and personal characteristics that make an applicant particularly exceptional. As of 
2005, Shenzhen will consider and accept hukou transfer from people who fall into the following 
three categories: technological experts; tax-paying investors; and policy transfers. The first 
category includes those who hold college degrees in technology, those who have two years of 
international work experience in technological or management posts, and returning overseas 
students. The second category of investors includes business owners who have paid over six 
million Yuan in tax over the last three years and individuals who have paid over 240,000 Yuan in 
tax over the last three years. The third category of policy transfers refers to employees who 
move to the city on government policy assignment as well as their dependents. The standards 
for hukou transfer are very strict.  
Modern-day China labor regulation 
 Labor law in China is divided into statutory, administrative, and international law. Guo 
(2003) provides a detailed summary of the existing state of labor law.  
 Statutory law is drafted by ministries and passed by the National People’s Congress, the 
highest legislature in China’s government. In regards to statutory law, the Labor Act of 1994 is 
the foundation for labor standards, covering wages, working hours, child labor, forced labor, 
women’s rights, and collective bargaining, in addition to describing a labor inspection system. 
The other important act is the Trade Union Act of 1992, which codified a system for trade 
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unions. The act legally allows one union per company or institution, and all unions must belong 
to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU). 
 Administrative law is set by agencies and consists of regulations, policies, and orders. 
Administrative law concerning labor has regulated minimum wage, protection of female 
employees, labor management of foreign-owned companies, and many other topics. An 
example of one regulation is the 1993 Regulation Concerning Minimum Wages in Enterprises. 
These regulations imposed minimum wage based on geography, while recognizing the right of 
municipalities to set their own standards. Furthermore, municipalities have the right to 
differentiate between industries in setting minimum wage. Administrative law is more relevant 
than statutory law because new policies get implemented by administrative law first before 
being passed as statutory law. As an example, family planning existed as administrative law for 
two decades before being codified in the Population and Family Planning Act in 2002.  
 Finally, China follows international labor law. The International Labor Organization (ILO) 
is responsible for setting international labor standards, which can then be ratified by individual 
member states. Out of 170 international conventions created by the ILO, China has joined 23. In 
comparison, the United States has joined 14 conventions but only 12 have been ratified by the 
Senate. International conventions affect collective bargaining, forced labor, equal employment 
opportunities, safe working conditions, and other topics.  
 Labor law applies equally to migrant workers and resident workers. However, 
recognizing that the implementation and protection of migrant workers is weak, since 2000, the 
Chinese government has required local governments to strengthen initiatives around protecting 
migrant labor rights, including minimum wage, working hours, and working safety. Furthermore, 
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the government has mandated the inclusion of migrant workers in urban social insurance 
programs and the Housing Provident Fund (HPF) program to help employees improve their 
housing conditions. Extending even beyond the rights of the migrant workers, the government 
has mandated protections for migrant children. In 2003, the government required local 
governments to provide equal access to compulsory education for all children (Li and Chu 
2011:3). 
 There has been a clear discrepancy between policy and implementation. Despite the 
many policy initiatives to protect migrant workers, few initiatives have delivered the 
anticipated outcomes. For example, researcher surveys conducted in 2005 discovered that only 
20-40% of rural to urban migrants were enrolled in the state mandated insurance schemes 
(Zheng and Huang 2006). This phenomenon is explained by employer incentives: many 
employers have a strong incentive to not enroll migrants in social insurance programs because 
they are required to contribute to those programs. Therefore, bypassing enrollment will save 
on employer costs. Migrant workers also show unwillingness to participate in social insurance 
programs because of either lack of knowledge or lack of confidence in the returns of 
participating (Xu, Guan and Yao 2011). 
 Migrant workers do have the means to petition for protection of their rights. They can 
appeal to local Labor Dispute Arbitration Committees, and if that fails, they can follow up in 
court (Halegua 2008). However, arbitration has its problems. The first problem is that 
arbitration can be costly, requiring time and fees that migrant workers cannot afford (Tong and 
Xiao 2005). Secondly, employers might drag their feet at the arbitration process, making it more 
difficult for the migrant worker to appeal effectively and forcing the worker to drop the case. 
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Thirdly, local officials may be biased towards employers in the interest of enhancing the 
municipality’s economic growth, creating an environment in which migrant workers are 
discouraged from applying for arbitration in the first place. Lastly, arbitration decisions can be 
difficult to enforce effectively. Even if migrant workers are rewarded with compensation, their 
employers can wait on returning wages to the workers. In the long waiting time period, 
significant factors like costs of living in the city or family circumstances could force workers to 
return to the countryside (Zheng 2005). 
The discrepancy between education policy and implementation is particularly apparent. 
Although local municipalities are required to provide education to the children of migrant 
workers, most cities still set high barriers to public school entrance (Li and Chu 2011). Migrant 
workers are required to present credentials that they might lack, including birth planning 
compliance, health check-ups, and social insurance enrollment. Failure to comply with all 
entrance requirements may result in additional fees. Certain municipalities have explored 
private school options for the children of migrant workers. For example, Shanghai has 
designated and provided subsidies to specific private schools for the children of migrants (Li 
and Peng 2009). However, most municipalities do not subsidize private schools. In those cases, 
the schools for the children of migrant workers are below standard with poor facilities and 
shortages of teachers (Luo 2009).  
The need for external laborers 
 Industrial economies segment labor demand in capital-intensive primary sector and 
labor-intensive secondary sector (Piore 1979). The demand for external laborers arises because 
of two factors related to this bifurcation of labor demand. Firstly, locals do not work in the 
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secondary sector due to the lower pay and job instability, which creates the need for external 
laborers. External laborers do not settle in the city, or else that would change their reference 
frame from the place of origin to the place of destination. Secondly, a competitive export-
oriented sector depends on cheap labor. The temporary nature of workers makes them easily 
expendable and reduces the cost of investing in higher labor standards. In other words, 
temporary workers become vulnerable, subject to labor exploitation (Chan 2009).   
The economic growth of the past decades lends support for this theory. China’s 
economic growth has been fueled by a labor-intensive secondary sector consisting of export 
oriented industries, especially the manufacturing sector. Lee (1998) summarizes evidence 
which shows that migrant workers compose 70 to 80 percent of the labor force in coastal cities 
such as Shenzhen and Dongguan. In other cities, rural migrant labor is estimated to contribute 
30 and 31 percent of the GDP in Beijing and Shanghai respectively (Nongmingong 2009). Chan 
(2009) argues that “freeing” peasant labor from rural areas has been a particularly effective 
strategy for positioning China as the world’s most competitive cost producer. The existence of 
labor control has deflected the “Lewis turning point,” the point at which a modernizing 
economy’s capital accumulation begins to increase wages to make it less competitive at 
producing. China continues to extract labor from rural areas and deploy it in export-oriented 
sectors at rural wage rates. Since 1980, there has been very little real increase of wages for 
rural migrant workers in coastal cities, even though the economy has burgeoned in the same 
time period (Sanyi 2009).  
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Methodology 
Developing the idea for the project 
 My interest in the topic of labor migration, demographic change, and development in 
China was partially shaped by my personal and family background. My father grew up in a rural 
area of the Hunan province of western China. Just like other rural migrants who moved out to 
urban areas to seek opportunity, my father moved to Beijing to seek educational opportunity. 
He was only 16 when he earned admittance to a top tier school in Beijing. When he arrived at 
his dormitory in Beijing, it was the first time he had been in a large city. He once described the 
process of acclimatizing to the city as ‘very painful,’ and he bore a chip on his shoulder for much 
of his university career. This resulted from his lowly status as a rural migrant and the cultural 
barriers that he faced in the city. For example, he was unaccustomed to the processes of 
navigating the streets, markets, and fancy restaurants. Ultimately, he adjusted well and the 
story concludes with his migration to America and my upbringing on this side of the world. 
 My personal interest in China developed into an academic interest as a university 
student. An anthropology course on global labor conditions inspired me to focus my senior 
thesis on labor migrants in China. My professor, Dr. Jaesok Kim, has conducted ethnographic 
research in factories in Asia. He became my thesis advisor as I planned a summer research 
experience modeled off of some of Dr. Kim’s past research.  
 I began by defining the scope of my research. The subjects of my research are migrant 
workers who move from the countryside of China to the city to find work. To understand their 
experiences better, I knew that I had to conduct ethnographic research.  
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The research project evolved from a vague sense of purpose into a more formal 
proposal once I defined suitable locations for my project. I was attracted to Shenzhen because 
it is widely cited in literature as the model city for labor migration and economic development. 
Shenzhen was originally a small farming village dwarfed by its next door neighbor, Hong Kong. 
The Chinese government piloted the first Special Economic Zone (SEZ) in this area on August 
1980. With land acquired from locals, the Chinese government constructed public 
infrastructure while attracting direct investment from Hong Kong and foreign manufacturers. 
Labor migration transformed Shenzhen from a small fishing village into a vast metropolis, 
counting over ten million inhabitants today. 
 Shenzhen is located in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in Guangdong province. This region, in 
southern China, includes both Hong Kong and Macau. The PRD has attracted a large proportion 
of foreign direct investment in China, for example, accounting for 24 percent of all of foreign 
investment in China (Shen et al 2000:312). 
 Once I decided to conduct fieldwork in Shenzhen, I needed to find a suitable company. 
My mother’s cousin helped me get in touch with the head managers of a paint company 
headquartered in Shenzhen with factories in Zhuhai and Chengdu. In February and March, I 
contacted the head managers of the company to arrange the accommodations and details of 
my research project, and I spoke with supervisors who I would be directly interacting with. My 
methodology, which I will describe later in this section, did not require me to pose as a worker. 
I fully represented myself as a scholar conducting research. The head managers decided to 
“hire” me as an unpaid intern so that I could perform work at the factories and reside in the 
dormitories.  
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 The paint company was founded in 1992, when a professor of chemical engineering 
moved to Shenzhen during the China’s period of economic reform; Shenzhen had been founded 
only 12 years prior with the advent of the Special Economic Zone (SEZ) model. The company 
launched with a founding team of eight professors and ten factory workers. Initially, the 
company operated in a 200 square meter factory building with no office. Since then, it has 
grown to a total of 208 employees, with a full-fledged upper management team composed of 
eight individuals, and around twenty middle level management supervisors. Over time, the lead 
founder bought out the ownership stakes held by his seven partners. To this day, the company 
is largely held by his family with smaller stakes held by outside investors.  
Arriving in Shenzhen 
In May, I arrived in Shenzhen. I first stayed at the Shenzhen corporate and R&D campus, 
where I stayed for 3 days to meet with the upper management and to discuss my plans for the 
remainder of my research project. The Shenzhen headquarters is located in the Bao’an district, 
in an industrial zone pushed away from the center of the city. A manager told me that the paint 
company’s office campus is one of only two office properties in the area, making it a unique 
piece of real estate. It is surrounded on all sides by factories. The campus is composed of two 9-
story office buildings, a 6-story living quarters building with dormitories, a small convenience 
store, and a cafeteria on the ground floor (Figure 1). While the real estate is wholly owned by 
the company, not all of the individual offices are occupied by the paint company because many 
of them are rented out to other companies. For example, BMW has an office on the 7th floor of 
the main building. 
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The Shenzhen corporate and R&D campus employs 88 people total. Upper level 
management consists of 8 people, R&D division consists of 14 scientists, sales and marketing 
division consists of 30 individuals, and property maintenance, security, and construction consist 
of the remaining 36 employees.  
My research at the corporate and R&D campus progressed in the following way: firstly, I 
attended discussions with upper management where I learned about the company; secondly, I 
was paired with a manager who gave me a tour of the corporate campus; and thirdly, I was 
paired with Yan, a property maintenance supervisor who introduced me to workers to 
interview. In total, I interviewed 20 employees who ranged from security guards to scientists. I 
also interacted with employees when I was not conducting interviews or touring the corporate 
campus. I ate my meals in the main cafeteria and used this as an opportunity to sit down with 
the employees that I had most recently talked to.   
My interviews were conducted informally and usually in an ad hoc way. In the process of 
walking around the facility with Yan, we would come across an employee whom she would 
introduce me to. After initiating discussion, usually about my visiting status and my recent 
arrival in China, I would tell the employee that I was conducting a survey for a research project 
for school. I would then ask the employee if I could ask a few questions for my survey. In every 
case, the employee responded in the affirmative. My interview questions were structured 
under four topics: background, family, working and living conditions, and societal views. The 
interviews often veered away from the questions that I had prepared in advance; accordingly, 
each interview followed a slightly different structure.  
35 
 
Re-locating to Zhuhai 
 After spending three days in Shenzhen, I went to the factory in Zhuhai. The factory is 
located on the outskirts of Zhuhai, next to the ocean and away from the metropolis, in an 
industrial area. A long highway connects Zhuhai’s metropolis to its periphery, which is flanked 
on both sides by factories. The Zhuhai factory sits on 110,000 square meters of land, which is 
like 11 football fields put together. There are nine buildings in total, with small paved roads that 
connect them. The main building houses the office and dormitories. The main building is 
separated from the eight other buildings (production facilities) by a yard, basketball court, and 
hedge of grass. The production facilities are labeled A, B, C, D, E, F, G, and H; these facilities 
have different functions. For example, Buildings A and B are responsible for purchasing and 
storing raw materials, while Building H is responsible for packaging final paint product and 
preparing shipments (Figure 2).  
The Zhuhai factory employs 120 people total. Management consists of 7 individuals, 
factory workers consist of 80, cleaners consist of 3, security guards consist of 8, office workers 
consist of 19, and cafeteria cooks and attendants consist of 3.  
I lived and worked in the Zhuhai factory for two and a half weeks. On the first day, I 
toured the facility and moved into my room. For the subsequent ten days, I reported for duty in 
the mixing facility.  I worked about 9 hours every day, beginning at 8am and ending at 6pm with 
an hour lunch break in between. During the lunch and dinner breaks, I found time to interact 
with employees. Again, I used my meals as an opportunity to meet new people and to be 
introduced to new employees. All total, I interviewed 21 employees who ranged from cleaners 
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to chief supervisors. This was in addition to the notes that I collected from informal 
conversations and interactions while working in the mixing facility. 
Ethnography and interview process 
During my fieldwork at the Zhuhai site, I was involved in two tasks: participant 
observation in the factory facilities, cafeteria, and dormitories to analyze the interactions 
between migrant workers and their work, and interviews with the employees of the factory to 
learn about their personal backgrounds, motivations for migration, and insights on the hukou 
system. The interviews were conducted over the course of longer, more informal interactions.   
An example of questions organized by topical area is as follows: 
Background 
- Where is your laojia (hometown)? 
- Why did you come to Shenzhen? 
Family 
- Do you have children or a spouse? 
Working/Living 
- Where do you live? (Employees are given a choice of residing in the dormitories at no 
cost or finding their own accommodations.) 
- Where do you eat? (Many employees choose to eat at the cafeteria and their meals get 
automatically deducted from their wages, but some choose to buy food elsewhere to 
save on costs.) 
Societal Views 
- Do you possess Shenzhen Hukou? How do you feel about the Hukou situation? 
I found it easier to build rapport with some workers than with others. I made a 
particularly strong connection with Long, the driver who is responsible for carrying out errands 
such as shuttling executives to and from the corporate headquarters in Shenzhen. Long drove 
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me from Shenzhen to Zhuhai, and over the course of the three hour drive, we exchanged 
stories about our backgrounds and knowledge about each other’s cultures. At the Zhuhai site, 
Long introduced me to many of his friends, which extended my interactions to workers outside 
of my colleagues in Building E. In Building E, where I was assigned to work, I found a helpful 
friend in Zhai, the zuguan (manager). Zhai ensured that I was paired with a colleague on all of 
the tasks that I was assigned to complete, which gave me the opportunity to interact informally 
with my colleagues.  
 All interviews were conducted in Mandarin Chinese. In Shenzhen, Yan was present for 
many of my interviews and occasionally helped me to phrase complex concepts. In Zhuhai, I did 
not have any interpreter or manager with me. I had a pen and notepad with me at all times, 
and I would take notes during or after interviews, depending on whether my hands were 
occupied. I did not record any of the informal interviews because I thought that it would disrupt 
the natural flow of work in the factory.   
Ethnography 
The average family in America must make $600,000/year 
 It was my third day at the factory in Zhuhai. I was on my lunch break with Long, the 
factory driver. Long is responsible for running errands, including driving into the city center to 
make deposits at the bank, shuttling executives back and forth from the Shenzhen corporate 
office, and buying ad-hoc supplies. Long and I were having a discussion about income when he 
blurted out that the average family in America must make 4 million Yuan (around $650,000 per 
year).  
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 I told him that his guess was quite far from the truth. A household with an income of 
$650,000 per year was definitely very, very rich. The median household income in the United 
States in 2011 was $52,762 (United States Census Bureau 2011). His response indicated to me 
that his impression of the United States was very skewed toward assuming that people in the 
United States are more wealthy than they actually are, but it also suggested that Long was 
aware of the huge divide between the rich and the poor. If he had assumed that American 
households make $650,000 per year, how did he feel about comparing his own income to this 
figure?  
 Long is 37 years old. He is from Jiangxi province, joined the army when he was 18 years 
old, then went to Shenzhen after two years of service. It was in the army where he picked up 
driving skills. He started working for the chemicals company when he arrived in Shenzhen and 
he has been with the company ever since, which is about ten years. According to Long, most of 
his childhood friends have left Jiangxi province and are now employed in various cities, 
exemplifying the rural to urban migration patterns that have characterized his generation of 
rural Chinese.  
 Long earns 3,000 yuan per month, which is a little less than $500. Of this amount, he 
sends 2,000 yuan per month back home to Jiangxi to support his three daughters and his 
elderly parents. Although his family situation is very inconvenient, it is quite typical for a 
Chinese migrant worker. As the background discussed, it is difficult to raise a child in the city 
without possessing permanent hukou. Only recently have cities begun to pass regulations that 
enable access to education to all children regardless of hukou status. For example, the 
39 
 
Shenzhen municipal authority recently issued a decree in 2007, stating that residence permit 
holders and their children have the right to public education (Shenzhen’s residence card 2008).  
Though separated from his three children, who are 13, 6, and 5 years old, he and his 
wife luckily work for the same employer. Long’s wife works at the factory as an office staffer, 
typing and printing logos for shipments of paint products. They also reside in the same 
apartment, in special accommodations provided exclusively to employees who are married. 
Although there was no official policy for recruiting spouses of existing employees, I suspect that 
it is in the factory’s interests. Companies may also see the advantages in increased work 
attendance and efficiency of male workers in robust family relationships (Klubock 2006:438). 
Companies may provide benefits for married employees such as special accommodations; these 
benefits can be interpreted as a form of social welfare.  
  Long’s wife earns 2,000 yuan per month, bringing their combined income to 5,000 yuan 
per month. Their expenses compose primarily of she bao (social insurance) (800 yuan per 
month), phone bill (400 yuan per month), and water and electricity for the apartment (80 yuan 
per month). Food provided by the factory is deducted from their wages at a very marginal rate. 
The apartment is provided to them rent-free. This implies that Long and his wife put away 
roughly 1,720 yuan per month, which is equal to around $275 per month or $3,300 per year. 
Long did not mention any additional expenditures or discretionary spending, for example, on 
clothing, appliances, or technology, beyond saying that his cell phone was purchased for 1,000 
yuan.   
 I use Long to illustrate the typical income profile of a migrant worker, in terms of 
earning power, expenses, and savings. Variations in income depend on numerous factors, 
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including location, industry, career progression, and whether the company is foreign-owned or 
Chinese-owned. In general, foreign-owned companies pay higher wages than Chinese-owned 
companies. For example, British Petroleum (BP) has a factory located five minutes away; 
according to Long, BP pays over 50% higher wages than the chemicals plant. Career progression 
and rank also play a role in determining wages. A good factory worker can advance to zu guan 
(manager) and earn a 1,000 yuan per month raise, bringing the total wages to 4,000 yuan per 
month.  However, wages are not correlated to years of experience – at least, not at this factory. 
Long’s wage has not increased in many years despite his years of service to the company; in fact, 
many newer employees start at a higher base wage than he does. The factory pays competitive 
wages for new employees in order to recruit them, but it does not give commensurate raises to 
old employees. 
 There is no typical age profile of a migrant worker (Figure 3). The demographics of 
workers depend on the industry and job function. I was surprised to find that I was the 
youngest person at the factory; in several cases, I was as young as the children of migrant 
workers whom I interviewed. Chemical plants such as this paint factory have an older 
demographic than manufacturing plants, where the workers are mostly between the ages of 15 
and 30 (Chang 2009). The work at chemical plants is less stressful than the work at 
manufacturing plants with assembly lines. Assembly lines, which produce physical and 
mechanical products such as TV sets or fans, typically pay their workers a fixed piece rate for 
each unit produced regardless of time spent. Younger workers are drawn to assembly lines in 
pursuit of higher wages because they have better dexterity and more resilience than older 
workers. Several workers at the paint factory had previously worked for assembly lines, and 
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switched jobs after they could no longer keep up with the rate of work or deal with the stressful 
environment. 
 Variations in demographics also exist by job function. Qingjiegong, cleaners or janitors, 
are likely to be 40 years or older. According to several of my interviewees, young people will 
not take a cleaning job in order to save mianzi (face). However, the occupation makes a decent 
wage at around 2,000 yuan per month. One cleaner that I interviewed reported saving roughly 
10,000 yuan per year and sending it back home to where her child resided, with the hope that 
her child could attend university. Baomu are maids who can be hired to cook and clean private 
residences; baomu tend to be middle-aged women. These women are too old to work in 
factories, instead preferring the comfortable working conditions of private residences. Baomu 
make between 2,200 to 4,000 yuan per month and cut costs by sharing apartments with 
colleagues at baomu agencies or living in their customers’ houses. 
 As an older man with children, Long faces the decision of whether to raise his children in 
the city or to leave them at home to be raised by his parents (the children’s grandparents). This 
is a common situation that migrant workers face. Children of those who possess rural hukou 
will also possess rural hukou regardless of where they are born, and rural designation creates 
tremendous disadvantages for migrant children in the city. Migrant children face obstacles in 
enrolling in public schools, even though law requires most municipalities to provide education 
to all (Li and Chu 2011). Even despite recent reforms, migrant children must enroll in private 
schools and pay higher fees that the children of permanent urban residents do not pay.  
 I asked Long if he would raise his children in the city if there was no zanzhufei (school 
fee). He said that he possibly could, but most likely would not. Without considering education, 
42 
 
it is still cheaper to take care of the children back at home in Jiangxi than to raise them in the 
city because the living expenses are a lot cheaper. For example, the food grown on his farm at 
home can feed his entire family at a very minimal cost of farming. His house and farm sits on a 
2 mu property, which I take to mean 2 acres; the size if this property is significantly larger than 
a small apartment in the city. All in all, he would not be able to provide a good standard of living 
for his children in the city.  
 His response indicates an attitude of self-reliance. This attitude is remarkable in light of 
how China has changed in the past three decades. It was only 25 years ago that it was 
impossible for rural migrants to legally come to Shenzhen to reside and work in the city (Shen 
1995); liberalizing the hukou system has made the massive rural to urban migration pattern 
possible and enabled individuals such as Long to take chances by moving to the city. For Long to 
have such a self-reliant strategy is remarkable: he is, in effect, maximizing his income by staying 
in the city but minimizing his risk by keeping his farmland and his children in the countryside. 
This strategy might explain why Long and other migrant workers are willing to contend with 
lower wages and temporary status in the city (Stark 1991).  
Leaving for higher wages at other factories 
I found that workers displayed little loyalty to the firm. This attitude did not seem to be 
a result of factors specific to the paint factory, but rather an attitude that was prevalent 
amongst migrant workers. Several interviewees expressed the view that they would leave their 
jobs if they could earn higher wages at another factory. The labor supply seemed to be highly 
mobile and noncommittal to employers; this was contrary to my expectations of exploitation 
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and vulnerable workers, which predicts that workers would be dependent on employers for 
residence permits, free rent, and economic livelihood.  
 All employees of the factory, apart from the executives and upper level managers, are 
employed “at will.” This means that they can be fired or depart at any point in time. Workers 
are free to leave if they wish to return to their rural provinces. Workers also receive major 
holidays off. The most important recurring annual holiday is chunjie, or Spring Festival (also 
known as Chinese New Year), which occurs for one week usually in the beginning of February. 
Chunjie is a homecoming of sorts, a tradition in which families gather for an annual reunion, 
partake in community festivities, and distribute gifts. Participation in this holiday is very high, 
with anxious migrants bidding bus and train tickets for this week several times over the regular 
fares. As was described to me by Zhong Wenke, the train fares increase five-fold from 100 to 
500 yuan, and train passengers have nowhere to sit but must stand with no room for their feet; 
passengers are squeezed on all sides.  Other sources reported that train fares increase by about 
30%, but I was unable to confirm. Almost all those who have the financial means will partake in 
chunjie; the factory all but shuts down for that week.  
 Consistent with the idea that temporary migration is a useful strategy that enables 
migrants to maximize income and minimize risk by spreading out between rural and urban 
locales, many interviewees expressed confidence that they can return home whenever they 
want or once they tire of their jobs and rest for a few years before going out to find work again.  
Other findings have shown that this often occurs when migrant workers go home for chunjie: 
migrant workers may even fail to notify their employers that they are quitting their jobs, going 
home for the holiday and failing to return to the city after the week is over. When this happens, 
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migrant workers may be fully confident that they can come out to the city to find work again 
(Chang 2009). 
 Of the 21 interviewees at the Zhuhai factory, the majority of them had recently joined 
the company within the last two years. My results were biased partly due to my placement in 
the factory: workers rotate between different buildings and departments, but according to my 
manager, Building E is where the new workers start. In order to counter this bias, I made a 
conscious effort to interview workers in other departments in addition to Building E. 
 The results suggest a high turnover rate because the majority of those that I interviewed 
had joined the factory within the past two years (Table 1).  These results are from a small 
sample of the entire factory’s workforce. After speaking to management, I learned that the 
number of people who leave the factory every month is approximately three to five. The 
factory hires on an as needed basis, picking new people to fill those vacancies. Recruitment is 
conducted at the rencai shichang, the “talent marketplace.” Every city has a rencai shichang, 
and they are located in administrative buildings and operated by the municipal government. 
For a nominal fee of around 10 yuan, any individual can visit a rencai shichang and receive 
assistance from a government employee to fill out online forms to apply for certain jobs. 
Alternatively, rencai shichang also hosts job fairs, where employers attend, set up booths, and 
interview and select people on the same day. 
What I discovered from speaking to many of the employees is that recruitment also 
occurs through informal networking. In fact, none of the interviewees described using rencai 
shichang to get hired at the paint factory. Many employees already had contacts in the factory, 
whether spouses, relatives, or friends. These contacts had referred them to the employer. 
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Ching Kwan Lee (1995) expressed a similar finding in research on networks of migrant workers 
in Shenzhen. Networks are established based on common rural village or county ties. During 
the annual chunjie (Spring Festival) in which migrants return to their rural villages for a week to 
celebrate the passing of the New Year, migrant workers spread news about job opportunities in 
the city and help locals from their towns find work. Once they are in the city, locals spread 
information about job openings in other factories to help fellow townspeople to change jobs. 
These networks extend beyond spreading information to offering financial assistance in the 
form of emergency loans and general assistance in times of duress.  
 Despite the lack of loyalty and the willingness to switch employers for an increase in 
wages, interviewees expressed satisfaction with ziyou, or freedom of flexible working 
conditions. In the Zhuhai paint factory, the work environment is relaxed and gives considerable 
autonomy to workers to accomplish work tasks. This environment is not at all like the assembly 
lines described by Lee (1995), which are despotic in organization. Previous research conducted 
at despotic factory regimes in Shenzhen described three forms of control: restrictions on 
physical movement such as using the bathroom; temporal control in the form of shop-floor 
bells and punch-card machines; and docking of wages for poor behavior.  
 At the Zhuhai paint factory, workers arrive at the cafeteria between 7:30-8am and eat a 
quick meal for breakfast. Breakfast is the same every day – one tin bowl of quick noodles and 
one bowl of porridge. After breakfast, workers must swipe their badges and press their fingers 
against a fingerprint scanner at the security guard booth at the entrance of the factory. The 
workday usually begins with a meeting led by the zuguan (manager) in each respective building. 
Each of the eight buildings (labeled A-H) has a different function; I spent the majority of my 
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time working in building E. All of the buildings have windows to allow for natural lighting, unlike 
the dimly lit factory environments that have been described in other ethnographies (Chun 
2003).   
 Building E is a mixing facility. It is the most complicated building from the outside, 
flanked on both sides by an array of pipes, tubes, and huge vats. It is about four stories tall, but 
only actually consists of two accessible levels because the first floor opens up into a vast area 
with a three-story tall ceiling. My job responsibilities varied day to day, but mostly consisted of 
ad hoc tasks. For example, I would act as a runner to bring measurements from Building E to 
managers of other buildings. I spent the entirety of one workday bringing barrels upstairs via 
the industrial elevator. I coordinated with the purchasing department (Building A), which was a 
storehouse of sacks of different chemicals.  I was given autonomy to complete tasks and often 
paired with another employee. This gave me plenty of time to observe and work closely with 
other employees. 
Managers and employees agreed on the flexibility of movement and lack of physical 
controls. Consistent with these views, I observed that workers are free to come and go into 
different buildings and around the factory campus as they please; in fact, many tasks require 
that they meet with colleagues in other buildings. As I mentioned, I would frequent the 
purchasing department to ask for the required raw material inputs for Building E’s operations. 
The presence of zuguan (managers) is very minimal because each manager sits in an office 
alcove of his or her respective factory building. Aside from the morning meetings and lunch and 
dinner breaks, I rarely saw Building E’s manager unless I walked into his office alcove to ask 
questions.  
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 Some of the tasks are very physical in nature, for example, lifting and moving 100 pound 
barrels. Because of this, operational and floor workers take regular breaks in between physical 
tasks. Every now and then, workers would prop a plastic stool next to the entrance and sit 
outside to catch a break and breathe fresh air. 
 Lunch is served at 12pm. Lunch offers considerably more variation and selection than 
breakfast.  The choice consists of two cooked vegetables, one or two meat dishes, steamed 
white rice, and a bowl of salty soup. For example, my meal during my first day at the Zhuhai 
factory consisted of the following dishes: lajiao (peppers) stir-fried with eggs; green beans; 
spicy fish; baicai (Chinese cabbage); and a bowl of steamed white rice. I found the food to be 
palatable but low quality in terms of ingredients – cheaper cuts of meat, less fresh vegetables, 
and a higher proportion of peppers and oil to add flavor to what would otherwise be a 
flavorless dish.  
 Workers generally sit with their closest colleagues, meaning the workers who also work 
in their building or department. Because workers wear colored uniforms that represent their 
job function, I could easily distinguish among workers and observe how they sat with one 
another. Blue shirts mark operations and floor workers; these workers let their shirts hang 
loose. White shirts are the uniforms of office workers, who tuck in their shirts and wear belts. 
Tan jumpsuits indicate mechanics and chemists who do more of the heavy lifting, such as tasks 
that require the closest contact with vats and chemicals. Facilities works including cleaners and 
maids do not have uniforms and wear their own clothing, which consisted of sleeveless shirts 
and long pants in the summer.  As an operations worker in Building E, I was fitted with an 
oversized blue shirt and a pair of khaki pants. 
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Entertainment at lunch is provided in the form of two TV screens located on the walls of 
the cafeteria. I found that conversation was quite minimal, with workers fixating their 
attentions on the TV serials – action and drama shows.  But fortunately, most workers 
welcomed conversation when I initiated. I would usually begin by asking about their 
hometowns, a topic that even the most reticent would discuss passionately. Broaching the 
subject of personal history was significantly easier after discussing hometowns. Most workers 
recognized me as a new employee and were curious about my origins. My standard explanation 
was that I was an American student and an intern at the factory; I was conducting research on 
the business and the working conditions. By the end of my first week, news of me had spread 
throughout the factory, and I no longer needed a lengthy explanation when introducing myself. 
I found that lunch break afforded me the greatest opportunity to meet new individuals and 
conduct interviews.  Lunch is followed by an afternoon siesta. Workers return to their 
departments and buildings and lie on the ground next to the windows. 
No wenhua (culture) 
 Zhang works in Building H, which is the largest department at the factory in Zhuhai. 
Building H is responsible for packaging the final paint product and preparing it for shipment. 
There are 28 workers in Building H, spread out between the first and second floors, with four 
workers and the manager in the office alcove of the second floor. Zhang is 45 years old and he 
has worked for this paint company for two years now. He sits at a desk at one corner of the first 
floor, conducting paperwork and filling orders. He is originally from the Shanxi area of Hunan 
province. He first left home in the 1994-1995 timeframe, married his wife in Shenzhen, and 
then brought his two children back to Hunan to be raised by his parents – reflecting the 
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common strategy of parents living apart from children with grandparents rearing children in 
rural areas. 
 Zhang was very blunt about his situation when I asked him how he came to join the 
company. He said that he has no wenhua (culture) and therefore must work in an industry 
characterized by manual labor. His parents wanted him to study harder, but his grades were 
never good so he was discouraged by school. He never went to college or vocational school and 
only has a high school education. But he does not regret not trying harder in school, because he 
simply does not have the ability to perform well inside the classroom. Like other workers, he 
seemed to be resigned or accepting of his situation, with a very neutral attitude towards his job 
(neither positive nor negative) and a blunt assessment of his prospects for more fulfilling work.  
 The language used to refer to uneducated people as lacking wenhua (culture) seems 
very degrading, but it is grounded in the historic treatment of and attitudes towards the rural 
populace. It is linked to the suzhi (quality) movement, which first arose in the 1980s in the 
context of eugenics. Yan (2003) describes the rise of suzhi movement, in which political and 
urban elites of the post-Mao era viewed the rural population with considerable anxiety and 
apprehension and saw the need to implement population planning in rural areas under the 
motto yousheng youyu (“superior birth and nurture”). The rural population was viewed as a 
chaotic mass of people, large in quantity but low in quality, weighing down on the national 
ambitions to develop China’s market economy.  
 Yousheng youyu culminated in a series of sterilization campaigns. In 1983, a campaign 
was conducted to sterilize women with two or more births. The larger strategy behind this 
campaign was to eliminate third or higher order births by the end of the 1980s (White 
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2006:140). The campaign would exempt minorities and those who had proof that they had used 
birth control effectively for the past five years with no unplanned births. The order was made 
by the highest rungs of government and communicated to provincial level officials, who set 
quotas for sterilizations (in the form of tubal ligations and vasectomies), abortions, and 
intrauterine device insertions. By the end of the one year program, more than 16 million 
women had been sterilized; the program was viewed as successful and its successes are 
attributed to  a lack of instructions sent to the local officials to avoid using physical force and 
coercion (White 2006:143). In fact, local officials were motivated by results (quotas) and not 
worried about the methods taken to achieve those results. Several campaigns followed in the 
early 1990s, with evidence of abuse and widespread use of physical force  only emerging later, 
confirmed by officials at the birth commission and central government (Greenhalgh and 
Winckler 2005:250). In the worse examples of abuse, rural women were taken by force and 
placed in cages, where they underwent tubal ligations or had intrauterine devices inserted 
without anesthetic (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005:252). A local party official explained that the 
rural women were like oxen: when you first put the yoke on an ox’s back, it struggles and resists, 
but once you tighten the yoke, it accepts its fate as inevitable (Huang 1998:78).   
The pressure on rural populations has eased since the mid-1990s, but the attitudes that 
treat the rural population as uncivilized, dirty, low in quality, and a threat to undermine 
modernization (Greenhalgh and Winckler 2005:250) remain behind. It has evolved into a more 
paternalistic view and is expressed in both official discourse and everyday speech. For example, 
one author for a Communist party magazine emphasizes that the goal of the nation should be 
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to educate the peasants, in order to improve their political, economic, and cultural suzhi (Liu 
1996).   
 As important as suzhi is to national development, the precise definition of it is difficult 
to trace. The clearest definition was given at a national conference in 1987, in which scholars 
proposed the following: suzhi is composed of physical qualities (“hardware”) and soft qualities 
(“software”). Soft qualities consist of culture (wenhua suzhi), psychology (xinli suzhi), and 
consciousness (sixiang suzhi) (Yan 2003:496). As difficult as the concept is to define, it 
distinguishes minority areas from Han Chinese areas, rural populations from urban populations, 
and developing countries from developed countries; the latter in each comparison is recognized 
at having a higher level of suzhi (Li 1988:60).  
 Suzhi is communicated to the population through various means. One means is through 
propaganda. Woronov (2009) describes seeing banners placed throughout his neighborhood in 
northwest Beijing, bearing the slogan “The quality of the people must be raised. Eugenics and 
raising children is very important.” In addition to overt forms of propaganda, the concept of 
raising the quality of children spread amongst educators and municipalities in the early 1990s; 
municipalities embarked on local campaigns to reform pedagogy, curricula, and teacher training 
in the name of suzhi jiaoyu (a neologism meaning “education for quality”) (Woronov 2009:571). 
Just like the definition of suzhi itself, the educational reforms taken in the mission of achieving 
suzhi lack specificity and instead appear to be feeding into an imaginary national dream. At the 
most concrete level, this national dream translates into children being assessed at the end of 
the semester on dimensions such as obedience to parents, politeness, attitude towards 
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strangers, frugality, respecting school discipline, and recognizing their own weaknesses and 
need to improve quality (Woronov 2009:577). 
Suzhi is so commonly expressed that it has entered everyday speech. In my interviews, 
some of the managers in the Zhuhai factory and even the workers themselves reference this 
idea of quality, linking it to wenhua (culture) and jiaoyu (education). Zhang was not alone in 
bluntly describing his own lack of wenhua. 
Motivations for leaving home 
Peng, unlike Zhang, has no children. Peng is only 27 years old and works at the security 
guard booth at the entrance of the factory. He is originally from Hubei and studied computers 
at a local vocational school. He moved to Shenzhen in 2004 to join a computer company that 
recruited him out of vocational school, but after two years of working at the computer 
company he quit his job; failing to find a suitable second job, he moved back home to farm, 
where he became bored and migrated back to the city, ending up in Zhuhai and working at this 
paint factory. Unlike the older workers at the factory, Peng does not send any money back 
home. Instead, he spends it on himself. Because he studied computers, he has the hobby of 
collecting technology: he owns an iPhone, a personal laptop, and several other electronics. 
When describing why he left home for the second time, he said that he was not developing at 
home and wanted to fazhan (develop) as a person. He chose to come to  
Piecing together the motivations of people to migrate to the cities was a difficult task. 
Based on the 21 interviews that I conducted at the factory in Zhuhai, I have organized 
interviewees’ migration considerations into five different categories. In response to the 
question of why they had migrated to the city, most interviewees described that they needed 
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to look for work and that there was no work at home. A smaller proportion of interviewees, like 
Peng, explicitly described wanting to develop as a person. The remaining respondents 
characterized migration as a result of studying and enrolling at vocational schools in the city, 
family decisions to move en-mass to the city (one older man settled in the city and started 
working at the Zhuhai factory because his son and daughter-in-law were working at the factory), 
or being encouraged to move to the city by local networks or friends (Table 2).   
It was similarly difficult to trace the precise patterns of migration, since many migrants 
had moved back and forth from rural to urban areas, changing the cities that they migrated to. I 
make an attempt to list the original province of origin for the 21 interviewees at the Zhuhai site 
and the 20 interviewees at the Shenzhen site (Table 3). I found that most workers that I spoke 
to originated from Hunan province, which is located immediately northwest from Guangdong 
but is much less urbanized than Guangdong. The proximity of Hunan province explains why 
many workers originated from there. The most distance migrated was from Heilongjiang 
province, located at the very northeastern tip of China, in an area known historically as 
Manchuria.  
 The motivation to develop as a person is consistent with the notion of suzhi (quality). 
The younger workers whom I interviewed seemed to express more dissatisfaction with rural life 
and were more ambitious about their prospects for developing in the city. Consider the 
response that Zhong Wenke, an office worker in the Shenzhen corporate office, gave to explain 
why he migrated to Shenzhen in the first place: 
 Shenzhen is very kaifang (open) and diverse. It is close to Hong Kong, which is an 
opening to the rest of the world. By coming here, I can learn more about the world than I 
could where I came from. People come here from everywhere in China. I used to think 
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that beifang ren (northern Chinese) are different, but I changed my outlook after going 
to school and meeting new people here.  
 Zhong Wenke is 29 years old and married with his wife, who resides with him in 
Shenzhen. He is originally from Hunan province but went to Huanan Nongye Daxue (South 
China Agricultural University) in Wushan, Guangdong province.  He graduated in 2008 and came 
to Shenzhen to work; he has worked for four years at the paint company with a focus on 
marketing. His explanation above shows that he has very specific ideals for why he chose to 
work in Shenzhen.  Also, his background is unique in comparison to the factory workers in 
Zhuhai. While most of the ethnography thus far has focused on workers at the Zhuhai factory 
site, where I conducted most of my fieldwork, Zhong Wenke provides an example of a 
university graduate whose skills are employed by the Shenzhen corporate office. No workers at 
the Zhuhai factory site had university education, although a few did attend vocational post-
secondary school (Table 4). 
 Peng and Zhong Wenke, in contrast to Zhang, are more confident about their prospects 
for personal growth. Zhang, who is older and more experienced in factory labor, was very blunt 
about his situation and resigned to the idea of doing manual labor for the rest of his career. 
Peng, on the other hand, hopes that he can continue to learn about computers and one day 
develop the skills to work at a computer company again. Zhong Wenke, for now, is content 
doing his office work and living the city life in cosmopolitan Shenzhen.    
Conclusion 
This paper has examined the experience of rural migrant workers in China in relation to 
changes in the government’s method of labor control from socialist to neoliberal. My findings 
are that migrant workers in paint factories in Shenzhen and Zhuhai express neoliberal ideals 
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because they believe that they have agency over their personal improvement and accept failure 
as the fault of the individual rather than the fault of society. Furthermore, they are self-reliant 
and use temporary migration as a strategy to achieve personal and economic development 
while minimizing the risks of not being able to make a living in the city, choosing to keep their 
permanent homes and families in rural areas.  
Neoliberal methods of labor control include the gradual relaxation of rural-to-urban 
migration restrictions and propaganda movements that promote neoliberal discourses. I argue 
that both of these actions represent neoliberal governmentality: a conscious attempt by the 
government to reduce welfare while mitigating popular discontent. Neoliberal governmentality 
can partially explain why labor exploitation continues to exist in its present form of low wages 
and limited welfare for migrant workers, without leading to resistance. While romanticized 
ideas of resistance predict that exploitation leads to resistance, my thesis argues that the lack 
of resistance in migrant workers can be explained by neoliberalism, neoliberal governmentality, 
and the creation of self-reliant workers.  
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Appendix 
Figure 1. Shenzhen Corporate Campus Site Layout 
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Figure 2. Zhuhai Factory Site Layout 
 
 
Table 1. Years of Employment at Zhuhai 
Factory 
0 - 1 year 8 
1 - 2 years 9 
2 - 5 years 4 
 
 
Table 2. Migration Considerations   
Motivation for migration (%) 
 
 
Look for work 48 
 
Develop as a person 24 
 
Study 10 
 
Family / marriage 10 
 
Friends / local networks 10 
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Table 3. Migration Patterns 
 Province of origin (%)  
 
Hunan 38 
 
Jiangxi 14 
 
Guizhou 5 
 
Szechuan 10 
 
Hubei 14 
 
Anhui 5 
 
Heilongjiang 5 
 
Henan 5 
 
Guangdong 5 
   Settlement plans (%) 
 
 
Would settle in new city in future 57 
 Would want to return home 43 
 
 
Figure 3. Workers by Age Range (Zhuhai Factory) 
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Figure 4. Workers by Education Level (Zhuhai Factory) 
 
Figure 5. Zhuhai Factory Site, View from Entrance 
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Figure 6. Location of Guangdong Province, China 
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Figure 7. Urban versus Rural Population Percentages in China (after Smith 2011) 
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